Legislative professionalism has played a prominent role in state politics research for decades. Despite the attention paid to its causes and consequences, recent research has largely set aside questions about professionalism's conceptualization and operationalization. Usually measuring it as an aggregate index, scholars theoretically and empirically treat professionalism as a unidimensional concept. In this article, we argue that exclusive use of aggregate indices can limit state politics research. Using a new dataset with almost 40 years of data on state legislative resources, salary, and session length, we reconsider the validity of using an index to study professionalism across the states. We evaluate the internal consistency of professionalism components over time, the relationship between components and the Squire Index, and the degree to which professionalism components are unidimensional using classical multidimensional scaling. We find enough commonality and enough variation between professionalism components to support a range of measurement strategies like the use of unidimensional indices (such as the Squire Index), disaggregating the components and analyzing their effects individually, or formulating multidimensional measures. Scholars should take care to choose the appropriate measure of the concept that best fits the causal relationships under examination.
components of professionalism: legislative resources measured as staff or expenditures, legislator compensation, and time in session (Grumm 1971; Morehouse 1981; Bowman and Kearney 1988; Squire 1992) . While scholars have disagreed on the meaning and construction of professionalism indices (see Mooney 1994; Squire 1992; Moncrief 1988; Rosenthal 1996; Brace and Ward 1999) , almost no work examines the implications of measuring professionalism with an aggregate index.
Measuring professionalism using an aggregate index is a unidimensional measurement strategy; we believe this strategy unnecessarily restricts state politics research and comes with important limitations that often go unrecognized. Professionalism is a heterogeneous concept both empirically and theoretically. Empirically, many states have chosen to professionalize in some components more than others, which has led to a diversity of forms that professionalism has taken across the states and over time (Moncrief 1988; Kurtz 1992) . Theoretically, professionalism can have varied (and even contradictory) effects on state politics due to the functional independence of the components (Woods and Baranowski 2006; Squire 2007; Kousser 2005; Kousser and Phillips 2009; Gamm and Kousser 2010) . Extant professionalism indices ignore much of this variation and instead measure the "common denominator of all the variables" (Grumm 1971, 317) . Under certain conditions, scholars may find it beneficial to disaggregate the index into its individual components or to create multidimensional measures of the concept as best suits the needs of the research project at hand.
In this paper, we present a new, publically available dataset on legislative professionalism which measures each professionalism component -expenditures, compensation, and session length -individually, across the states. These data allows us to reevaluate professionalism's conceptualization and measurement. We measure each component biennially from 1973/4 through 2009/10; this provides us with the opportunity to examine both short term and long term changes in professionalism. We utilize these data to evaluate the measurement of legislative professionalism. Conceptualizing professionalism as set of distinct institutional characteristics of a state legislature, rather than a single latent construct, we evaluate the internal consistency of professionalism components over time, the relationship between components and the Squire Index (Squire 1992; 2007; 2012) , and the degree to which professionalism components are unidimensional using classical multidimensional scaling (MDS).
These analyses lead to several important conclusions. First, there is simultaneously enough commonality and enough variation between professionalism components to support a range of measurement strategies like the use of unidimensional indices (such as the Squire Index), disaggregating the components and analyzing their effects individually, or formulating multidimensional measures. Scholars should take care to choose the appropriate measure of the concept that best fits the causal relationships under examination. Second, the Squire Index performs well in our tests and accurately taps the commonality between professionalism components. Thus the Squire Index appears to be a reliable and valid measure of the broad differences between amateur and professional legislatures, matching previous examinations of the index (Malhotra 2006; Squire 2007 ). Yet, there remains substantial variation in professionalism components not accounted for by unidimensional indices like Squire's. This variation is large enough for the MDS solution to be two-dimensional, with the second dimension representing over 17% of the variation in the dissimilarity between professionalism components across the states and over time. This second dimension appears to match a supportintensive vs. work-intensive dimension as suggested by Rosenthal (1996) . We conclude that the evidence in support of a heterogeneous conceptualization and measurement of professionalism suggests that researchers may benefit from disaggregating the index into its constituent parts. As nearly all work on professionalism has utilized an aggregate index, disaggregation provides an under-utilized and promising avenue for future research.
Professionalism and State Legislative Reform
State politics scholars have referred to professionalism in two distinct ways. First, scholars consider professionalism as one distinct concept, usually as a measure of legislative capacity. Mooney, for example, writes that professionalism "refers to the enhancement of the capacity of the legislature to perform its role in the policy-making process" (1994, (70) (71) .
Alternatively, professionalism has been conceptualized as the specific institutional characteristics used in its measurement (Moncrief 1988) , with staff or expenditures for the legislature, legislative compensation, and time in session being the most important components. These two perspectives are not mutually exclusive; scholars commonly use the term to refer to both overall capacity and specific institutional developments, often in the same paragraph (e.g., Squire 2012, 266-267) .
Such a dual-perspective makes sense given the history of legislative professionalism. The study of legislative professionalism grew out of a reform movement intent on modernizing state legislatures for the challenges of post-WWII America, most notably the expansion of the role of both the federal and state governments and the development of the welfare state. State legislatures, now released from decades of malapportionment following Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, were called upon by reformers to be a primary agent in the new, active state (Bowman and Kearney 1988; Mooney 1994; Squire 2007) .
1 Reformers recommended numerous institutional changes to modernize legislatures, from increasing pay and removing constitutional restrictions on session lengths to shrinking the number of legislative seats, converting from bicameralism to unicameralism, and streamlining committee systems (APSA 1969; CED 1967; CCSL 1971) . The states' professionalism, then, could be measured either as an overall level of legislative capacity or in terms of specific sets of reform policies adopted.
The development of the professionalism index for scientific use arose out of this reform movement. Grumm (1971) first developed the concept by listing characteristics which could be used to distinguish "professional" from "amateur" legislatures. Professional legislatures are "well staffed; good informational services are available to them; a variety of services and aids, such as bill drafting and statutory revision, are maintained and well supported; the legislators themselves are well paid, tend to think of their legislative jobs as full time or close to it, and regard their legislative role as a professional one" (Grumm 1971, 309) . Amateur legislatures lack these features.
Scholars created early professionalism indices using factor analysis. The indices differed mostly in which components are included as input variables (Grumm 1971; CCSL 1971; Morehouse 1981; Bowman and Kearney 1988) . 2 The most important development of the professionalism index is Squire's (1992) modification. Squire jettisons some components from previous indices and for theoretical reasons focuses on three core variables: legislative staff, base salary, and time in session. He abandons factor analysis and instead measures each state's components relative to those of Congress and then averages the three ratios to arrive at a single professionalism score.
Existing professionalism indices share an implicit latent variable conceptualization of professionalism with the underlying concept measured by the shared variation between the components. This approach is unidimensional; each state legislature is placed somewhere on a continuum with a "professional" or "capable" legislature like Congress at one end and an "amateur" or "citizen" legislature like New Hampshire's at the other (Squire 2007) . 3 The implications of this approach, rather than a component-centric view of professionalism, are large.
By explicitly measuring the commonalities in the professionalism components, factor analysisbased indices ignore each component's unique variation. This decision makes sense under certain conditions. For example, if only one dimension exists across the professional components, then unique variation separate from the overall commonality might be safely ignored; any observed variance is then derived from measurement error or perhaps from some other aspect of the component that is conceptually distinct from professionalism. It is also possible that all three components so closely covary that they cannot be accurately utilized separately in regression analysis. In such situations, it is prudent to combine information from all three components rather than to rely on data from only one.
Yet, these conditions often do not hold. As we show below, the correlation between the three components is only moderate; inter-item Pearson's r correlation coefficients since the early 1970s rarely reach .7 and often fall substantially lower. Further, there are substantive differences in how states professionalize. States can (and do) professionalize in some areas and not others (Moncrief 1988 Depending on the theoretical mechanisms (for example, constituent service, research capacity or legislative experience) that link professionalism to other political phenomena, such differences may matter for appropriate testing of professionalism's causes and consequences.
The problem is broader; unidimensional indices cannot capture differences like those between Florida and Arizona and simultaneously measure general differences in legislative capacity between citizen and professional legislatures. The states have varied both in how much they have
professionalized and in what ways they have chosen to do so.
It is difficult to know the substantive importance of these measurement concerns. Even if the states vary in how they professionalize, the effects of professionalism may still be driven by the broad, largely unidimensional difference between citizen and professional chambers. Further, it could be that components tend to have similar effects. In such situations it would not matter if professionalism is measured as three separate components or if as a single index. Other work has identified relationships driven by one component rather than the common variance in all components. Long session lengths appear to be the driving force behind professionalism's enhancement of the legislature's power in budget battles with the governor (Kousser and Phillips 2009) 5 and also are the reason why more professional states have greater congruence between public opinion and policy (Lax and Phillips 2012) . Legislative salary is associated with the introduction of district-focused bills at the expense of state bills, while session length has no such relationship (Gamm and Kousser 2010 ).
This research does not demonstrate that measuring professionalism as an index is always incorrect, or even usually incorrect. In fact, Woods and Baranowski (2006) show that the combined effect of resources and careerism is similar to the estimated effect of professionalism measured only as an index. Instead, these works show that disaggregating the index can help bring theoretical and empirical clarity which can be missing when components of professionalism have divergent theoretical expectations. As Gamm and Kousser note, "it is crucial to consider the individual effects that [professionalism's] constituent parts might exert. Each aspect of professionalism can alter a legislator's incentives and resources in a distinct manner" (2010, 156) . The implication of this research is that separating professionalism back into its constituent parts may be a fruitful avenue for state legislative research. In the following section, we describe our new data set and discuss our approach to analyzing the professionalism's internal consistency and dimensionality.
Measurement and Data Collection
We collected biennial data on state governments from the 1973-74 legislative biennium through the 2009-2010 biennium, measuring each of the primary components of Squire's (1992) index separately. We follow Squire's coding rules for the legislator salary and session length as much as possible. We measure legislative salary as the base amount paid to legislators in a given year and session length as the number of days the legislature met in the two year period following the beginning of the biennial session. Both items are derived from data published in showing few patterns and much noise during the nearly 40 year period. These trends generally match King's (2000) examination of professionalism change.
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A Test of Internal Consistency
How closely do professionalism components relate to each other, and do the relationships between components change over time? In other words, is a scale based on expenditures, salary, and session length internally consistent? Here we use Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach 1951; Cortina 1993 ) which evaluates consistency by examining the interrelatedness of items in a scale (Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003; Cortina 1993) . Overall, professionalism components perform well; the coefficient alpha based on pooling all the years in the study is .81. Since standard rules-of-thumb suggest that alpha scores between .7 and .8 or higher denote consistent scales, professionalism performs well. Figure 2 shows alpha values across each biennium along with inter-item correlations between components. Cronbach's alpha scores are quite stable over time.
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However, the magnitude of the contribution of each component to the index varies. 
The Dimensionality of Legislative Professionalism
The analysis up to this point has shown that professionalism components boast both commonality and variation. Professionalism components since the early 1970s have followed divergent trends, with only expenditures showing regular growth. Our internal consistency analysis matches with other conceptualizations of professionalism (Moncrief 1988; Kurtz 1992; Kousser 2005) by showing both evidence that the components can be adequately combined into a reliable and consistent additive scale (like the Squire Index) and that the inter-item correlations between components are not particularly high. In fact, while the professionalism components tend to move together across states, they do not necessarily do so. The scatterplots displayed in Is there a multidimensional structure to this heterogeneity? 15 Empirically identifying the number of underlying dimensions in a set of variables is a complicated task. Dimensionality is "the number of separate and interesting sources of variation" among a set of objects (Jacoby 1991, 27) . But there is likely no "correct" number of dimensions of professionalism; rather, dimensionality depends on the context and purposes of data measurement, with a unidimensional perspective performing well in certain research situations and a multidimensional one in others (Jacoby 1991) . The questions regarding professionalism, then, are: how many sources of variation exist across professionalism components and is that variation interesting and relevant to research on state legislatures?
As a more rigorous analysis of the data, we use multidimensional scaling (MDS) to determine the number of dimensions present in the components. Metric (or classical) MDS is a data reduction technique used to spatially represent differences between observations on a number of variables in a small number of dimensions. Distances between points in MDS note dissimilarity between the observations on the input variables. We convert the professionalism components of expenditures per legislator, salary, and session length to dissimilarity data and analyze the data using MDS.
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The MDS results show a primary dimension that accounts for 72.8% of the dissimilarity between observations. However, the MDS solution also includes a substantial second dimension representing 17.1% of the dissimilarity between observations. Approximately 90% of the dissimilarity between state-year data on professionalism components can be accounted for by these two dimensions. 
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This interpretation matches Rosenthal's (1996) conceptualization of professionalism.
Rosenthal argues for a legislature-(rather than legislator) centered definition of professionalism and suggests focusing on only staff and time in session. Using this typology, states could be grouped into 4 categories: high staff support and long sessions ("professional"), high staff support and short sessions ("support-intensive"), low staff support and long sessions ("workintensive"), and low staff and short sessions ("amateur") legislatures. Likewise, one could think of the second MDS dimension as a support-intensive vs. work-intensive dimension representing differences between professionalized states while the first is shows the broad differences between amateur and professional legislatures.
Does this second dimension matter? We can use goodness-of-fit statistics to get a sense of when and where the two-dimensional solution offers improvements over the one-dimensional solution, although a full accounting of this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Following Kruskal and Wish (1978) , we calculate Kruskal's stress scores both for the entire dataset and for each observation using both the first dimension alone and the first and second dimensions.
Kruskal's stress scores are a type of residual that measures the difference between the dissimilarities (data points) and the fitted MDS distances between observations. Stress scores range between 0 and 1; 0 represents a MDS solution that perfectly matches the input data and 1
shows MDS scores which do not represent the dissimilarity data at all. The aggregate Kruskal stress score using just the first dimension is .19. Including the second dimension cuts the stress score in half to .09, a much better-fitting MDS solution. 19 These scores indicate a moderate improvement by including the second dimension, and that the final two-dimensional plot fits the underlying data well.
Another way of examining goodness-of-fit is to calculate Kruskal's stress scores for each observation and then see among which state-years the two-dimensional MDS solution improves upon the one-dimensional solution. We present these results in Figure 6 . The height of each bar shows the improvement in stress scores caused by including the second dimension. The figure makes several interesting points apparent. Nearly every state in every session shows improved fit when we use the two-dimensional MDS solution (which is expected, a two-dimensional solution
should not fit the data worse than a one-dimensional solution); the degree of improvement, however, varies greatly across states and over time. For many states, particularly those that with citizen legislatures, the second dimension offers little improvement. Even some of the most professional states like CA, NY, and MI show relatively little improvement from the addition of the second dimension.
Two groups of states, however, show marked improvement: states with low expenditures, but relatively long sessions like MA, VT, and CO and states with high expenditures and staff but short sessions like FL, NJ, TX, and NV. 20 The improved fit for FL, TX and NV is particularly noticeable and the benefits of including the second dimension increase steadily over time. All three states have seen dramatic population growth and have followed a similar professionalization trajectory by sharply increasing expenditures and staff, decreasing base salary, but maintaining static session lengths.
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Discussion
We believe these findings have several important implications for the study of legislative professionalism. First, the Cronbach's alpha analysis shows that, both over the entire time series and in individual bienniums, an additive scale of expenditures, base salary, and session length can form a reliable measure of professionalism. Second, the Squire Index, the most prominent professionalism index, essentially captures the same variation as shown in the first dimension of the MDS solution, which accounts for about 72% of the dissimilarity between observations in our dataset. Thus, the Squire Index, while not accounting for all variation in professionalism components over time, does accurately capture the core conceptual differences between citizen and professional legislatures.
However, the results presented here show professionalism to be more heterogeneous than is typically presented in the literature. Correlations between components are only moderately strong. This is particularly true for the relationship between expenditures and session length. (Rosenthal 1996) . This variation is substantial, and should not be ignored when possible. Such a view fits both the raw components and the MDS two-dimensional solution. We find that citizen legislatures tend to be quite similar, with short sessions, minimal compensation, and limited support from staff. As states professionalize, and choose to invest resources into the legislature, the exact form professionalism takes varies.
Ultimately, there is likely no "one-size-fits-all" measurement of legislative professionalism. For some studies, a parsimonious, unidimensional operationalization of professionalism (like the Squire Index), will suitably measure the concept, particularly if the causal theory is indifferent to the types of resources legislators have available to them. Other studies may benefit from a multidimensional operationalization by using the raw component data presented here or by creating multidimensional measures through a scaling method such as MDS. While expenditures and staff, salary, and session length may go together in "syndromes of professionalism or amateurism" (Grumm 1971, 309) , scholars have also pointed to the diversity of professionalism components (Kurtz 1992 -change-chart-1979-1988-1996-2003-2009 .aspx. Expenditures per legislator and salary are in thousands of constant (2010) .7
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Note: Plots show the relationship between Squire Index scores and professionalism components for the years when Squire Index scores are available (1979, 1986, 1996, 2003, and 2009 Table 7 .6 and the first dimension MDS scores presented in Figure 4 . ND04 WY04 UT80  KY81  AL80  UT04 NM80  SD04  AL04  SD80  MT04 MT80   AR80  ME04  VT80   RI80   NV80  IN04   AR04   NM04   IN80   LA81  GA80  GA04 WV80   TN80  TN04  KS80   LA05   ME80   VA05   ID80   SC04  VA81   NV04   KS04   RI04  MS81  DE80  NC80   NJ81   ID04   DE04   KY04   CT80   VT04   TX80   OR04 . 6 1975/6 1985/6 1995/6 2005/6 1975/6 1985/6 1995/6 2005/6 1975/6 1985/6 1995/6 2005/6 1975/6 1985/6 1995/6 2005/6 1975/6 1985/6 1995/6 2005/6 1 The American Political Science Association's Committee on the American Legislature report, first published in 1954, exemplified such calls for reform. Legislatures were in dire need of modernization, argued the Committee, since the "increase in the number and score and complexity of government services at all three levels of government -national, state, and local -has imposed vast new burdens and responsibilities upon legislatures that are bound up by old and traditional concepts of organization and procedure" (APSA 1969 Kousser and Phillips (2009) provide a blueprint for future research on professionalism. First, they show that professionalism weakens the governor's position in budget stand-offs using the Squire Index and dummy variables for professional, semi-professional, and citizen legislature. Then they demonstrate that this effect is driven by session length and not salary (through influencing tenure and experience of legislators) or staff (through increases in information) by estimating the models with the professionalism components entered individually and one model with all three components included. Since the substantive results do not change across the models (i.e., salary is insignificant even when session length is not included as a covariate), the authors provide excellent evidence for their causal story.
